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In a five to four deci-
sion, the United States Supreme 
Court in Dolan v. City oJTigard, 
114 S. Ct 2309 (1994), held 
that in addition to the showing 
of an essential nexus between a 
land use permit and a legitimate 
state interest, there must also be 
a "rough proportionality" be-
tween the permit condition and 
projected impact of the land use. 
The ruling signaled the Court's 
unwillingness to ignore the guar-
antees secured by the Fifth 
Amendmenttothe United States 
Constitution in an era of in-
creasing land use regulatory 
schemes. 
The action originated 
when Florence Dolan applied 
for a permit to double the size of 
her plumbing supply store. The 
City Planning Commission 
("The Commission") granted 
the permit subject to its Com-
munity Development Code 
("CDC") which required, inter 
alia, that Dolan dedicate a por-
tion of her property, which lay 
in a floodplain, for a flood con-
trol greenway and a pedestrian! 
bike trail. The area in question 
approximated roughly ten per-
cent of Dolan's property, which 
she could rely upon to meet the 
fifteen percent open space and 
landscaping requirement man-
dated by the City's zoning 
scheme. 
Dolan applied for, and 
was refused, a variance from the 
CDC conditions. The Commis-
sion found that the larger facil-
ity would create more traffic in 
the area and that a pedestrian! 
bike trail could offset some of 
the congestion. The Commis-
sion further found that since the 
intensified development would 
also increase stormwater runoff 
into a nearby stream already 
strained by other sources of 
drainage, the dedication require-
ment was sufficiently related to 
Dolan's plans to further develop 
the site. 
Dolan appealed to the 
Land Use Board of Appeals 
("L UBA") on the grounds that 
the City's dedication require-
ment was not reasonably re-
lated to her proposed develop-
ment and constituted a Fifth 
Amendment taking. However, 
L UBA found a reasonable rela-
tionship between the proposed 
development and both the pe-
destrianlbike trail and greenway. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals 
affirmed, finding that the permit 
conditions were reasonably re-
lated to the impact of the expan-
sion of Dolan's business. The 
United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. 
The Court began by not-
ing that the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, 
through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, requires states to com-
pensate landowners when their 
land is appropriated for public 
use for the sole reason that gov-
ernment should not be able to 
force some people to bear bur-
dens, which, in all fairness, 
should be borne by the public as 
a whole. Id at 2316 (citing 
Armstrong v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40 (1960)). However, 
the Court acknowledged that 
government could hardly go on 
if diminution ofproperty values 
incident to a change in the law 
= 
required compensation, (citing 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1926)), 
and a land use regulation does 
not effect a taking if it '''sub-
stantially advances a state inter-
est' and does not 'deny an owner 
economically viable use of his 
land. ,,, Dolan at 2316 (quoting 
Aginsv. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 
260 (1980)). Simply put, in or-
der for a government to condi-
tion a permit on the dedication 
of land to the state, there first 
must be an essential nexus be-
tween the legitimate state inter-
est and permit condition. ld. at 
2317. (citing Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 
825 (1987)). If no such rela-
tionship exists, "under the well-
settled doctrine of 'unconstitu-
tional conditions,' agovernment 
may not require a person to give 
up a constitutional right--here 
the right to be compensated--in 
exchange for a discretionary 
benefit conferred by the gov-
ernment. ... " ld. Notably, the 
Court agreed with those below 
thatthe necessary nexus existed 
between the dedication require-
ment and the legitimate state 
interest in flood prevention and 
traffic reduction. ld. 
Turning to the question 
left open in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm 'n, the Court 
pointed out that in addition to 
determining whether the essen-
tial nexus requirement was met, 
it was further necessary to as-
certain whether the permit con-
dition bore the necessary rela-
tionshipto the impact of Dolan's 
proposed expansion project. 
Dolan at 2317-18 . Noting that 
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a use restriction may constitute 
a taking if not reasonably neces-
sary to the accomplishment of a 
substantial governmental pur-
pose, the Court pointed out that 
both the City's and the 
Commission'sfindingswerenoth-
ing but conclusory statements 
and, without more, insufficient 
to support a dedication require-
ment in a city zoning permit. ld. 
at 2318. 
After rejecting state 
court decisions which required 
only generalized statements of 
connection or very exacting 
causal analysis, the Court felt 
that a rough proportionality 
should exist between the re-
quired dedication and the im-
pact of the proposed develop-
ment. ld. at 2318-20. Turning 
to the facts before it, the major-
ity noted that the City's zoning 
requirement already required 
Dolan's property to remain fif-
teen percent undeveloped and 
could not understand how a pub-
lic greenway could better pre-
vent flooding than a private one. 
ld. at 2320. Of course, as to 
Dolan, her inability to exclude 
others meant aloss of one of the 
most fundamental of property 
rights. ld. (citing Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 
176 (1979». Further, the City 
only indicated that the bike/pe-
destrian trail could offset traffic 
conditions due to the expansion, 
not that it would, and made little 
effortto quantify its conclusion(s). 
ld. at 2321-22 (emphasis added). 
In sum, the Court concluded 
that while "[n]o mathematical 
calculation is required . . . the 
city must make some sort of 
individualized determination 
that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent 
to the impact of the proposed 
development." ld. at 2319-20. 
However laudable land use plan-
ning may be, the constitutional 
guarantee of compensation can-
not be short-circuited. ld. at 
2322. 
Ina spirited dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens, with whom Jus-
tices Blackmun and Ginsburg 
joined, criticized the majority 
for going beyond the essential 
nexus requirement established 
in Nollan and found the Court's 
rough proportionality require-
ment "remarkably inventive." 
Id. at2323. Further, the dissent 
noted that previous takings cases 
focused on the entire parcel in 
question and not merely the 
portion subject to the taking 
and that the right to exclude 
others is merel y one of a number 
of rights associated with prop-
erty. ld. at 2324-25, 2329. 
The dissent further split 
from the majority by pointing 
out that the ruling seriously de-
parts from the "traditional pre-
sumption of constitutionality" 
when states act pursuant to their 
police powers by "imposing a 
novel burden of proof on a city 
implementing an admittedly 
valid comprehensive land use 
plan." ld. at 2326. Under the 
guise of substantive due pro-
cess, Justice Stevens expressed 
concern that the majority was 
attempting to reassert a 
superlegislative power not seen 
since the Lochner era. ld. at 
2329. 
Ina lone dissent, Justice 
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Souter asserted that the Court 
applied a test no different than 
that announced in Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm 'no Dolan. 
at 2330. Rather than showing 
any lack of proportionality be-
tween the permit condition and 
adverse effect, Justice Souter 
opined that the Court simply 
found a lack of any rational con-
nection between the public 
greenway and flood control, and 
believed this to be nothing more 
than the "essential nexus test" 
announced in Nollan. Id. 
A victory for property 
rights advocates, Dolan V. City 
of Tigard assures landowners 
that they alone will not have to 
bear the burden of comprehen-
sive land use schemes. While 
the public has a strong interest 
in obtaining sensitive lands to 
protect the environment and 
provide forrecreation, the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitu-
tion require compensation be 
paid for lands acquired for pub-
lic use. Acknowledging the 
___ - __ __ _ _ .1 
pervasiveness of land use regu-
lation in Maryland, Dolan will, 
in all likelihood, result in an 
increase in litigation and force 
local governments to make in-
dividual determinations with 
regard to landowners saddled 
with potentially unfair permit 
conditions. 
- Robert Schulte 
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